The Strange Way China Got its Nukes...

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate metric of a powerful nation in the 21st century, wielding a formidable shadow that casts a palpable tension across nations. Currently, only 9 nations are on that elite list, namely the US, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, France, the UK, and last, but by no means least, China.

China, as the up-and-coming world power, is by far and away the most interesting member of this list, and yet, despite the inherent interest to the story and the deep-reaching geo-political ramifications their possession of nuclear weapons raises – the story of how they came about them is one that is often overlooked and neglected in western reporting. Today, we shall be righting that wrong – this is the story of China’s nuclear weapons.

Early Years and Soviet Influence

China’s path to nuclear weapons began in the 1950s, when the country was eager to throw off the shackles of the ‘Century of Humiliation’ and assert itself as a great power. There are many ways a nation can do this, but chief among them, Mao reasoned, was through the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal.

But how to achieve this? Developing nuclear weapons is no small matter, and for China, there was only one answer – enlist the help of their ideologically aligned friend north of the border: the Soviet Union.

The Soviets found this proposition agreeable, after all, they were then keen to see as much of the map turn red as possible, and so, they formally began co-operating with China on all things nuclear in the mid-1950s, pouring technical equipment, knowledge, and experts into the country, as well as establishing the Institute of Atomic Energy in Beijing – a nucleus for training China’s first generation of atomic scientists, as well as numerous uranium processing facilities.

Unfortunately, this co-operation was not long for the world, as despite both being Communist nations, they both had radically different interpretations of Marxism and how it should be implemented. This, along with more pragmatic disputes over borders, and leadership of the Communist world, eventually came to a head in 1960, when the two nations formally severed diplomatic relations with one another in what would become known as the Sino-Soviet Split.

The breakup had massive repercussions for China, because as the Soviets left they took their scientists with them, formally ending Soviet-Chinese nuclear co-operation. However, China’s leaders weren’t about to yet let years of progress go to waste. The foundation laid by the Soviets, though interrupted, had already set China on a path from which there was no turning back. They had the scientists; they had the facilitates… all they had to do was finish the job.

It also didn’t hurt that they had espionage on their side, and although it is hotly debated by historians just how much espionage contributed to the completion of the Chinese bomb, it is certain, that to SOME degree, the Soviets were still assisting with the project whether they knew it or not.

All things considered, things went rather well after the split, and after just a few more years of work – China had done it and completed its own atomic bomb. All that was left now was to test it.

Project 596

It was the 16th of October 1964, and in the vast, remote stretches of China’s Lop Nur desert, Project 596, China’s first nuclear test, was about to begin.

In the cool, predawn hours, technicians clad in their protective gear scurried about, double-checking every connection and every gauge. The desert, usually a silent witness to the passage of time, seemed to pause, its hush interrupted intermittently by the hum of equipment and the murmurs of those awaiting the appointed hour.

3:00 pm marked the moment of truth. With the push of a button, the vast desert was alight with an ethereal brilliance, the ground quaking under the sheer force of the explosion. China had triumphantly heralded its arrival in the nuclear club. Boasting a yield of 22 kilotons, the explosion’s blast was on par with that which had wrought devastation on Nagasaki in 1945. This test sent a clear message globally: China was no longer to be sidelined or underestimated. They were now among the elite.

So then, what next for China? The immediate concern was putting the bomb into serial production, but in the longer term, another, even more explosive goal came to the fore… a hydrogen bomb, and the exponentially greater yields they produced.

The need couldn’t be more pressing too, as the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom had already built such bombs, testing them in 1952, 1955, and 1957 respectively, and so, dutifully, China’s atomic scientists got to work – lets see how they got on.

Evolution and Expansion

The road to China’s hydrogen bomb was plagued with hurdles and potholes. The leap was not a mere incremental step, but a quantum jump. Atomic bombs, with their reliance on fission to shatter atomic nuclei, paled in comparison to hydrogen bombs which tapped into the enormous energy of fusion – the very process that powers the sun.

But while the road to the hydrogen bomb may have been plagued with obstacles, it was one that was easy enough traversed, as a mere 32 months after Project 596, the skies above the Lop Nur test site illuminated with a terrifying brilliance once again, as on the 17th of June 1967, China detonated its first hydrogen bomb in what it called ‘Test Number Six.’

The test went off without a hitch, and yielded a blast of around 3.3 megatons, a force over 150 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. For comparison, this was significantly smaller than the US’ first hydrogen bomb, Ivy Mike, which had a yield of 10.4 megatons, but somewhat larger than the USSR’s and UK’s first examples, which both yielded more or less 3 megatons.

In addition to the development of the bombs themselves, China also spent the late 1960s refining its missile delivery mechanisms. During the embryonic stages of its nuclear program, China had predominantly leaned on nuclear bombers such as the H-6 for such purposes, as its missiles were rather crude things then. Given bombers’ propensity for being shot down – the rationale behind improving their missiles was obvious.

The limitations of China’s early missiles are exemplified by the Dongfeng-2, China’s first nuclear capable missile. First tested in 1966, this was only an intermediate-range ballistic missile, with a maximum range of 1,250 kilometres. It was also inaccurate and used a complicated fuel system that inhibited swift deployment – a far cry from the whole “end all life on earth at a push of a button” type deterrent that one pictures when imagining nuclear weapons.

Thus, the Dongfeng missile series underwent a pivotal transformation. Most notable is the development and deployment of the Dongfeng-5 (DF-5), China’s first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Tested throughout the 1970s and finally put into service in 1981, it was capable of delivering a 3-megaton warhead over a distance of 12,000 kilometres with an accuracy of 1-200 metres.

China also upped its nuclear testing, conducting numerous tests aimed at both validating its designs, and showcasing its nuclear prowess on the international stage. Exampling the latter is ‘Test Number 21,’ conducted on the 17th of November 1976 – China’s largest ever test. Launched using a prototype DF-5 and producing a yield of four megatons, the aim of this test was simple – “look how big our missile mounted bombs can be.”

But exampling the former, more scientific approach, is ‘Test Number Eight,’ conducted on the 27th of December 1968. Dropped from a H-6 bomber, this test’s aim was to confirm the viability of plutonium as a reaction accelerant, which, given its yield of three megatons, it definitely did.

Policy and Doctrine

In its ascension to a major nuclear power, China also had to figure out its doctrines for when to use its weapons. This is harder than it may first sound – present yourself as too trigger happy, and rather than keeping the enemy at bay, you risk telling the world that you are little more than a rabid dog that needs to be put down, but on the flipside, present yourself as a pacifist who would never, EVER push the button, and you make your deterrent completely ineffectual.

China balanced this delicate dichotomy with the implementation of a “No First Use” (NFU) policy in the 1960s. This was exactly what it sounds like, no tricks or asterisks that hide a more menacing machination, just a nice simple: don’t shoot at us and we won’t shoot at you.

China maintains its NFU policy to this day, but while the Chinese attitude didn’t change, the real-world ramifications of it did as their nuclear technology improved and more and more countries came into range. For example, what use was the policy against the US in the 1960s when the country was out of range – the US would be free to bathe China in atomic fire and pay no heed to their threats of retaliation, thus rendering the policy moot, but with the coming of the DF-5, which put the mainland US firmly in range… suddenly that threat of Beijing returning the favour if they launched became a much greater point of focus for US defence planners.

Modernization and Technological Advancements

As the Cold War reached its end, China found itself wielding a formidable and modernized nuclear arsenal of 160 warheads. So, what came next? The answer to that question, in a nutshell, is MORE – more warheads, further refinement of delivery systems, and a strategic expansion of its capabilities. The Cold War may have ended, but China was no fool, it knew that there were a great many powerful countries that weren’t exactly its fans, and so, all efforts now went into making sure that it maintained its nuclear edge into the 21st century.

For China’s missiles, this meant not only extending their ranges, but also improving their accuracy, manoeuvrability, resistance to interception, and above all else, lethality. This need saw the development of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVS) – a missile that flies into space and then launches multiple warheads rather than just flying to its target and blowing up. Many such missiles emerged from this drive, (and the whole DF-5 cache was upgraded with such capabilities), but let’s focus on the Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) and Julang-3 (JL-3).

The DF-41 was introduced in 2017, and it appears to be an ICBM MIRV with the capability to launch up to 10 250 kiloton warheads. It can be road launched, and it is assumed that it can also be launched from static silos. It also has a range of up to 15,000 kilometres – bringing nearly the entire globe into range.

The JL-3, is a ICBM MIRV introduced in 2022. It appears to be able to launch three warheads and have a range of 9,000 kilometres. This may sound like a downgrade compared to the DF-41, but there is one extra detail that make its humbler capabilities make sense… it is smaller to fit in submarines.

We haven’t discussed China’s submarines yet, largely because they have been but a footnote in the story until now, but with China ploughing significant resources into them as part of its post-Cold War modernisation, let’s now pay them some heed. China only really had a single ballistic missile submarine (submarine that can launch nuclear missiles) during the Cold War, a Type 092 dubbed ‘Xia’ that was commissioned in 1983 – it was noisy, it was crude, and it didn’t carry many missiles; all in all, it just was not very good.

But that all changed with the coming of the Type 094. First commissioned in 2004, and with eight planned by 2025, it is everything the Xia wasn’t: its nuclear reactor is powerful and silent, it has all the modern gadgets, and it can carry up to 12 JL-3 missiles.

Parallelly, the air component has also seen a radical transformation since the end of the Cold War. The venerable H-6 bomber for example, has a new variant – the H6N, which has had its bomb bay removed entirely in favour of a mounting for air-launched nuclear missiles, allowing it to strike targets from long, safe distances. But even this may soon prove obsolete, as in 2016, China announced development of the X-20, a nuclear capable stealth bomber with an intercontinental range that will carry 10 tons of nuclear ordnance – and according to Chinese state media, it is imminently due to take its maiden flight.

International Agreements and Diplomacy

The post-Cold War world has also seen China change its nuclear politics. It still maintains its NFU policy but has become much more proactive with engaging with the world on all matters nuclear. For example, in 1992, it finally signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NPT, an international agreement first penned in 1968, aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament. The treaty establishes three main pillars: the prevention of the spread of nuclear weaponry (non-proliferation), the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (cooperation), and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. These are to be pursued in a manner that safeguards against the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and signatories agree not to share their nuclear technologies with non-nuclear-weapon states and to work towards nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

Similarly, China also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. The CTBT is a multilateral treaty that forbids all nuclear explosions, for both civilian and military purposes, in all environments. The treaty is notable for its establishment of a global verification mechanism to ensure compliance, involving a vast network of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide sensors – a mechanism with which China fully supports and hosts on its soil.

Furthermore, China has also demonstrated an evolving posture towards on-the-ground international cooperation and engagement, particularly in the realm of inspections. Embracing a more participative stance, China has engaged with multinational weapons inspections and initiatives, including those steered by the United Nations. This engagement is viewed through the lens of a broader, collective approach to international security and disarmament, and signifies China’s calculated integration into the global security apparatus. The participation in, and in some instances, endorsement of, international inspection regimes is indicative of China’s nuanced shift from an isolated nuclear strategy to one that is more entwined with global non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.

This all might sound a bit hypocritical, because lest we forget, this greater openness around its nuclear weapons has occurred at the exact same time as China is enormously expanding and modifying its nuclear arsenal, but, sadly, that is just the name of the game – most nuclear armed countries, do, and have done this. For example, the US and Russia have long participated in disarmament talks and treaties like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty while maintaining extensive nuclear modernization programs; its an unfortunate geo-political reality, everyone would LIKE a non-nuclear world, but achieving that proves significantly harder than the well-meaning emotion behind it may lead us to believe. Only three countries have ever gone the whole way and fully abolished their nuclear arsenal: Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine, with that last example also currently being a great example of why nuclear disarmament may not always be as good of an idea as it sounds.

Conclusion

The story of China’s nuclear weapons has been one of tentative beginnings, careful expansion, and meticulous long term strategic planning, and now, having successfully navigated through that intricate landscape equal parts technological and geo-political, it now undoubtedly stands as one of the nuclear big boys of the world.

So what does the future hold?

The answer, it appears, is more of the same. China, in various relevant press releases, has made it quite apparent that it intends to continue expanding and modernising its nuclear forces, and Western analysts don’t think they’re lying. A report released by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute in January 2023 believes that China will soon possess upwards of 400 warheads and is on track to possess 1,500 of them by 2035. The report also points to the imminent completion of the H-20 bomber, and the eventual completion of the Type 096 submarine (the successor to the Type 094) as evidence that they have no intention of breaking from form anytime soon.

Whatever it may hold, we aren’t going to uniquely decry China, particularly not when Russia and the US, despite making all the same noises about moving towards disarmament as China, possess just under 6,000 and just over 5,000 warheads respectively – it is simply an unpleasant reality that for so long as geo-politics remains as it is, the great powers of the world will feel the need to stockpile nuclear weapons. All we can do, when considering the future, is pray that situation eventually changes, and that no one is stupid enough to push the button in the meantime.

Key Takeaways

• China’s nuclear journey began in the 1950s with Soviet assistance, aiming to assert its global power.
• China successfully tested its first atomic bomb in 1964 and hydrogen bomb in 1967, despite the Sino-Soviet split.
• China’s nuclear doctrine includes a ‘No First Use’ policy, balancing deterrence without appearing aggressive.
• Post-Cold War, China has modernized its nuclear arsenal, developing advanced missiles and submarines.
• China engages in international nuclear agreements while continuing to expand and refine its nuclear capabilities.

Sources

• Original MegaProjects video: The Strange Way China Got its Nukes…
• Hero image source by HMGiovanniV / openverse, by-sa.

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