--- title: "The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant Saga: A Tumultuous Past and an Uncertain Tomorrow" description: "## Introduction\n\nFor as long as humans have known how to split the atom, so too have we known how to be nervous about splitting the atom. That skepticism isn't entirely baseless; catastrophes like Chernobyl, Fukushima, and Three-Mile Island have been a black mark on a means of energy production that is usually safe and fairly clean…but definitely has its issues from time to time. In many countries, skepticism over the risk posed by nuclear power has caused plants to be decommissioned early, or otherwise never be built at all. It's a headache for governments looking to move away from fossil fuels, and a persistently frustrating reality for nuclear scientists and advocates alike.\n\nBut the nuclear woes of the rest of the world have got nothing on the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Conceived in an attempt to bring the Philippines what would have been its only source of nuclear power, the Bataan plant instead turned into a lightning rod of bad luck. From building complications and cost overruns, to legitimate fears of corruption, to a persistent and public opposition emboldened by a series of worldwide nuclear catastrophes, the plant turned into the perfect engineering example of Murphy's Law: Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.\n\n## Background and Construction\n\nThe Philippines began its foray into nuclear energy in 1958, when the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission was established to lay the groundwork for a reactor. The Philippines had gotten access to a small uranium-235 fission reactor a few years prior, in which low-enriched uranium fuel could be studied and used to produce radioisotopes. This sort of research presented truly minimal risk to the people of the Philippines—seriously, as long as you didn't lick the uranium, you'd probably be fine. But even this early research effort had been met by significant skepticism and protest from the local community, so when the Atomic Energy Commission started doing its work, it was with that same uphill battle in mind.\n\nNow, to get around public pressure like that, there are a few main options. Officials could educate the public on the low risks and myriad benefits of nuclear energy, they could build away from population centers and critical infrastructure…or, they could declare martial law and do whatever they damn well pleased. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos hadn't declared martial law for that particular reason, but in 1973, he took advantage of the martial law he'd already declared to force the construction of a nuclear power plant. The regime's stated intent was to supply energy for the city of Luzon, via two reactors producing 621 megawatts of power each. In recent years, former Marcos deputies have alleged that the regime's actual goal was in part to facilitate nuclear weapons design, but at the time, the 1973 oil crisis had created a legitimate justification to be seeking nuclear power regardless. The regime actually planned for six power plants in total, but as we'll see, they appeared to have their hands full with one.\n\nThe Marcos regime chose Napot Point to host their new power plant, taking advantage of protected land on one of Luzon Island's peninsulas. The regime accepted two proposals for the plant's design, one submitted by General Electric, and the other by Westinghouse Electric. The project immediately got off to a weird start; faced with a detailed, well-thought-out proposal from General Electric with a price-tag of $700 million, and a note from Westinghouse that basically said, \"we can build you a plant for $500 million\" but said nothing about how they'd do it, Marcos overruled his advisory committee and went for the Westinghouse option. Apparently, nobody in his committee was quite courageous enough to ask, \"Ferdinand, what are you up to?\", or if they did, then it didn't have much effect.\n\nThe contract was awarded to Westinghouse in June 1974, despite not only the conflicting recommendations of Marcos' advisors, but the advice that the National Power Corporation had given him, as well. Funny enough, Westinghouse then paid somewhere between four million and thirty-five million dollars to one of President Marcos' close friends, who was also his in-law, who owned a company that had provided Westinghouse with \"assistance in obtaining the contract\". This friend, named Herminio Disini, was frequently asked to lobby President Marcos on various companies' behalf, with something like eighty percent of his recommendations to the President being acted on over the course of his lobbying career. And to make matters worse, the price of the plant more than doubled within a year, going from $500 million in 1974 to $1.2 billion in 1975. Why? Corruption, or as the regime put it, interest, transmission lines, and escalation costs. And another year later, word came down from Westinghouse that the Philippines would be getting just one 621-megawatt reactor, not two, and no, they wouldn't be reducing prices.\n\nIf this all isn't bad enough, don't worry, we've got plenty more for you. The site for the nuclear plant was located just five miles from a dormant volcano known as Mount Natib—always a fantastic sign—with three active geological fault lines within twenty-five miles. A little further away was the stratovolcano Mount Pinatubo, which was at that time dormant, but has since become active. Not only did this present a massive risk via the possibility of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, but the plant's location on a peninsula surrounded by open sea also brought it within range of tsunami waves from anywhere across the Pacific Rim, which we'll describe today as…geologically spicy.\n\nCompletely undeterred, the regime began construction on the plant in 1976, chugging along quite happily for the next three years despite continued public unease about the entire ordeal. In 1979, the nuclear disaster at Three Mile Island in the United States caused Westinghouse and the regime to put a temporary pause on construction, and mercifully, it appears that someone within the government was able to persuade Marcos and his advisors to conduct a safety review of the site. Good thing they did, because it found over four thousand defects. Personally, we'd like to think of the Marcos regime's failure to fix most of these defects as a factor that just adds to the plant's sort of rogueish charm, and Westinghouse seemed to agree. Although some of the issues were fixed, causing yet another doubling of the price to $2.3 billion by 1984, some were ignored, and construction continued within the same geological death trap that the safety report had pointed out was…well, a geological death trap.\n\nOn top of the location issues, the plant's interior had also devolved into a complete mess. The plant's internal wiring was a catastrophe, the support brackets that held up miles of electrical cabling and disposal pipes for radioactive water were unstable, and its pipes and valves were untrustworthy. For some of the issues that Westinghouse had technically fixed, they hadn't actually made any hardware changes; instead, they just rewrote some of the specifications for the plant. Filipino regulators were frequently cajoled or coerced into approving elements of the project that should never have reasonably gotten permits, and by 1985, the interest charges on the plant were increasing by about $350,000 every single day. The whole thing had devolved far past the point of being a comedy of errors, and had now taken the shape of a full-on nightmare.\n\n## Controversy and Opposition\n\nAt this point in the story, we should hope that you're wondering how the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant continued to escape being shut down—and for what it's worth, the people of the Philippines were wondering the same thing. Bowing to public pressure amidst a much larger political upheaval, the Marcos regime didn't immediately activate the plant after it was completed in early 1985. It wasn't abandoned, it wasn't deconstructed or fixed up, it just…sat there. And there it would remain, until February 1986, when the People Power Revolution overthrew the Marcos regime and a successor administration, led by President Corazon Aquino, took power.\n\nThe Aquino administration had their work cut out for them in a lot of ways, after inheriting a shattered political system from Marcos, but they were also stuck with the Bataan plant. It wouldn't be accurate to say that anybody in the Philippines needed yet another reason to be skeptical about the plant, but they got one anyway, two months after the Marcos regime fell. Across the world near the city of Pripyat, in what was then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the No. 4 reactor of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant suffered a catastrophic meltdown, compromising the plant and causing the worst nuclear disaster in history.\n\nThe disaster at Chernobyl shocked the world, and made it abundantly clear to the Aquino administration that the reactor at Bataan was not worth taking chances. Days following the Chernobyl disaster, Aquino's administration publicly announced that the plant would not begin operation, for a laundry list of reasons including, but not limited to public skepticism, the myriad safety issues at the plant, and the clear influence of state corruption in the whole affair. The Aquino government publicly accused the Westinghouse company of having bribed former President Marcos, and although Westinghouse attempted to write off Aquino's accusations because of prior Aquino campaign promises not to operate the plant regardless, those excuses went un-heard. Whether or not Westinghouse should have seen such a scandal coming, it was upon them now, and a company that had safely operated 71 other nuclear plants internationally with no major accidents was now responsible for a plant that could not even be turned on.\n\nThe United States Department of Justice reopened a bribery investigation against Westinghouse, which had previously been dropped in 1978, and when it reopened, the investigation got the full and enthusiastic support of the Aquino government. Westinghouse had plead guilty to prior charges, also in 1978, of having bribed Egyptian authorities in order to secure a contract for a conventional power plant, and by 1986, it had been either bidding or in early talks to build nuclear plants in South Korea, Yugoslavia, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, the Netherlands, and Egypt. Several of those national governments were already known for widespread corruption; several have had those suspicions reaffirmed in the years since. And with the entire world now fully aware of the consequences of a Chernobyl-style plant gone wrong, Westinghouse's shoddy work in the Philippines would raise eyebrows even among governments who were open to a bit of financial persuasion.\n\nIn the Philippines, the ramifications of the power plant's breakdown were severe. We've already mentioned that $2.3-billion price tag for the plant, but let's now put that number in context to the Philippines' GDP at that time, just $17 billion with a government budget of $1.5 billion. The plant's cost overruns by this point were so bad that even if the Philippines had stopped every other government function for an entire year, sent every public employee home, and ground the entire nation to a halt, they still would have owed $800 million after the year was up. The nation took on a massive amount of debt to deal with the cost of the plant, and again, they'd have nothing to show for it. The Aquino government created a cabinet position for minister Rene Saguisag, whose sole responsibility was dealing with the plant and its repercussions. The plant's inactivity was a big part of the rolling blackouts that took hold of the Philippines for years, from 1989 to 1993, which the government had seen coming for multiple years prior. But even more potentially harmful than those blackouts was the threat of turning the Bataan plant on, and then running the risk of a catastrophic equipment failure. Or an earthquake. Or a volcanic eruption. Or a tsunami. Or all of the above.\n\nIn the following years, Westinghouse would be sued for overpricing and bribery, but would be exonerated by a federal jury in the US state of New Jersey. After an appeals process, the Philippine government would eventually drop their suit for an unknown settlement of under $200 million. The Philippines had placed a two-year ban on Westinghouse products, but that ban was dropped during the settlement, as well. Westinghouse continued to insist that the plant was safe, even amidst ongoing findings from the Philippine government's external consultants that the plant should not be operated. Over the years, reports circulated that the Philippines might try and convert the plant into a conventional power station, but that resolution simply makes less economic sense than just building a conventional plant from scratch.\n\nOne person would be held responsible, though: Herminio Disini, who had lobbied his friend and in-law Ferdinand Marcos to accept the Westinghouse contract in the first place. In the decade that followed the collapse of the Marcos regime, Disini would watch his business empire crumble into ruin, eventually leaving the country to live in Austria. At the time, he was ordered to return $50 million in commissions that he had been paid because of the power plant deal, and turning ahead the clock a bit, his estate was forced to pay a billion dollars in damages in a 2021 judicial order, after Disini's death in 2014.\n\n## Cancellation and Resuscitation\n\nSo, that was the end of the Philippines' ambitions on nuclear power. The plant at Bataan had been a resounding failure, an ill-advised venture that demonstrated a remarkable ability to make itself worse, and worse, and worse. It had all been a ploy, a mechanism for Ferdinand Marcos, his cronies, and Westinghouse Electric to make themselves richer, with no regard for the possibility that they were setting conditions for a disaster that would have made Chernobyl look like a stubbed toe.\n\nExcept…that isn't where the story ends. The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant had hit rock-bottom, but even still, it's never been shut down. The Philippines have paid somewhere between $40 and 50 million a year to maintain the plant, for which the reactor unit is still intact, as the government continues to try and figure out what to do with it. In fact, the thing's been open to tourists for over a decade now, partially in an effort to educate the public about the long-term potential of safe nuclear energy—using the Bataan plant as a lesson learned, and a guide as to what not to do, in order to start a conversation about how the Philippines can get it right in the future.\n\nIn fact, the Philippines' eventual goal of opening a nuclear power plant hasn't gone away, even despite all the issues with their initial attempt in Bataan. The country has some of the highest domestic electricity needs in all of Asia, and given its status as a relatively poor nation within the region, there's still an emergent need for power that a nuclear plant would help significantly—and the Bataan plant is right there. With disasters like Chernobyl and even Fukushima in the rearview mirror, and a relatively stable political situation that could hypothetically oversee a second attempt, many within the Philippines are beginning to view the Bataan plant as a fixer-upper with real potential.\n\nThe Philippines have spent a good bit of time embroiled in dynastic politics; in 2011, when the plant opened as a tourist attraction, the President was Benigno Aquino, son of President Corazon Aquino, who shuttered the plant in the first place. Today, after the six-year rule of Rodrigo Duterte, the President is one Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and, no, it's not a coincidence that the country's late former dictator, also named Ferdinand Marcos, just happened to be old enough to be Marcos Jr.'s dad. With his father's nuclear plant now fully paid off, Marcos Jr., affectionately known as \"Bongbong\", has made nuclear power a top priority for his administration—and restarting the Bataan plant is priority number one.\n\nBongbong isn't the only one who believes resuscitating the plant could be a good idea. The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, found in 2008 that the power plant could have thirty years of good operation in it if it's refurbished and brought up to standards. That would come at a cost of around a billion additional dollars, but for what it's worth, the country's GDP has come a long way since $17 billion. In 2021, the national GDP was close to $400 billion, making a big expenditure like renovations on the Bataan plant seem at least more manageable. The Philippines' National Power Corporation has also solicited an assessment by Korea Electric Power Corp, which manages nuclear and other power stations, and that assessment found in 2009 that by their estimation, the Bataan plant should be refurbished. Korea Electric manages a very similar reactor in Korea, known as Kori 2. The National Power Corporation has continued to advocate for a commissioning of the Bataan plant ever since, pointing out that even the billion-dollar price tag is about three times cheaper than building coal-fired power plants to handle an equivalent capacity.\n\nAs of now, the Philippine Department of Energy has been issued a mandate to develop and implement a nuclear program. The mandate includes yet another assessment on the viability of the Bataan plant, where the price for refurbishment has since risen to $2.3 billion by 2022. Whether that assessment finds a refurbishment feasible, the government does plan to pursue nuclear power broadly, with up to 15 locations identified to host potential plants. The United States has begun to engage as a partner in supplying nuclear fuel and reactors for future construction, although details are not yet forthcoming.\n\nIf the Bataan plant ends up being found ready for refurbishment, it'll still face a series of uphill battles. In addition to the price tag and the long list of defects that need addressing, it'll have to be modernized. Even in the best-case scenario, the plant is staying put where it is, so it'll have to be reinforced against earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other geologic threats. And in the Philippines, especially in the areas around the Bataan plant, perceptions of nuclear energy remain predominantly negative. If the plant is to be commissioned, it'll either be in the face of public opposition, or it'll come after that public perception somehow changes.\n\nBut if the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant finally manages to get up and running, it'll put a finish on one of the most dramatic stories of any megaproject out there—a build where really, truly, everything that can go wrong, did go wrong, but managed to come back from the brink. If there's anything that is truly rare, in our world of successful and failed engineering endeavors, it's a megaproject that gets a second chance, where a new generation can come along and get something right, even after the prior generation left the whole thing in shambles. For the plant in Bataan, we can't say for sure that that second chance will come…but it's damn close, and if the Philippines can pull it off, then a truly exceptional redemption arc will have been etched into history.\n\n## Key Takeaways\n\n- The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant in the Philippines faced numerous issues, including cost overruns, corruption, and public opposition.\n- Construction began under President Ferdinand Marcos, who ignored safety concerns and geological risks.\n- The plant was never operational due to the Chernobyl disaster and subsequent public and political pressure.\n- Despite its troubled history, the Bataan plant remains intact and is being considered for refurbishment.\n- Current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has prioritized nuclear power and is exploring the plant's potential.\n\n## Frequently Asked Questions\n\n### What is the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant?\n\nThe Bataan Nuclear Power Plant is a nuclear power plant in the Philippines that was conceived to bring the country its only source of nuclear power. However, it turned into a lightning rod of bad luck due to building complications, cost overruns, corruption, and public opposition.\n\n### When was the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission established?\n\nThe Philippine Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1958 to lay the groundwork for a nuclear reactor.\n\n### Why was the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant constructed?\n\nThe plant was constructed to supply energy for the city of Luzon via two reactors producing 621 megawatts of power each. The regime also had plans to facilitate nuclear weapons design, although the 1973 oil crisis provided a legitimate justification for seeking nuclear power.\n\n### What were some of the major issues faced during the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant?\n\nThe construction faced building complications, cost overruns, corruption, and public opposition. The site was located near a dormant volcano and active geological fault lines, and the plant's interior had significant issues with wiring, support brackets, and pipes.\n\n### What happened to the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant after the People Power Revolution in 1986?\n\nAfter the People Power Revolution, the new administration led by President Corazon Aquino decided not to operate the plant due to public skepticism, safety issues, and corruption. The plant was never activated and remained inactive.\n\n### What was the impact of the Chernobyl disaster on the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant?\n\nThe Chernobyl disaster in 1986 reinforced the Aquino administration's decision not to operate the Bataan plant, highlighting the risks and the influence of corruption in its construction.\n\n### What is the current status of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant?\n\nThe plant has never been shut down and is maintained at a cost of $40-50 million a year. It has been open to tourists for over a decade, and there are discussions about refurbishing and reactivating it.\n\n### What are the plans for the future of nuclear power in the Philippines?\n\nThe Philippines plans to develop and implement a nuclear program, with up to 15 locations identified for potential plants. The Bataan plant is a candidate for refurbishment, and the U.S. has begun engaging as a partner in supplying nuclear fuel and reactors.\n\n### Who was held responsible for the issues with the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant?\n\nHerminio Disini, who lobbied President Marcos to accept the Westinghouse contract, was held responsible. His estate was ordered to pay a billion dollars in damages in a 2021 judicial order.\n\n### What are the potential challenges for reactivating the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant?\n\nThe plant faces challenges such as a high price tag for refurbishment, a long list of defects, the need for modernization, and public opposition. It also needs to be reinforced against geological threats.\n\n## Sources\n\n- [Original MegaProjects video: The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant Saga: A Tumultuous Past and an Uncertain Tomorrow](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NjxZwbg69Fc)\n- [https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/09/01/67989/](https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/09/01/67989/)\n- [https://books.google.com/books?id=drykAQAACAAJ](https://books.google.com/books?id=drykAQAACAAJ)\n- [https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/16/business/westinghouse-pact-with-philippines.html](https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/16/business/westinghouse-pact-with-philippines.html)\n- [https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/15/21/sc-awards-over-p1b-in-damages-to-ph-vs-late-marcos-crony-over-nuke-plant-project](https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/15/21/sc-awards-over-p1b-in-damages-to-ph-vs-late-marcos-crony-over-nuke-plant-project)\n- [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14184234](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14184234)\n- [https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/397/bataan-plant-sequel](https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/397/bataan-plant-sequel)\n- [https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/12/613/12613423.pdf?r=1](https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/12/613/12613423.pdf?r=1)\n- [https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx)\n- [https://tradingeconomics.com/philippines/gdp](https://tradingeconomics.com/philippines/gdp)\n- [https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx)\n- [http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/camacho2/](http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/camacho2/)\n- [https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/duterte-approves-inclusion-nuclear-power-philippine-energy-mix-2022-03-03/](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/duterte-approves-inclusion-nuclear-power-philippine-energy-mix-2022-03-03/)\n- [https://energycentral.com/c/pip/bataan-nuclear-power-plant-philippines-nuclear-plant-and-dream-fizzles](https://energycentral.com/c/pip/bataan-nuclear-power-plant-philippines-nuclear-plant-and-dream-fizzles)\n- [https://www.powermag.com/philippines-may-restart-bataan-nuclear-plant-project/](https://www.powermag.com/philippines-may-restart-bataan-nuclear-plant-project/)\n- [https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Philippines-relaunches-nuclear-energy-programme](https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Philippines-relaunches-nuclear-energy-programme)\n- [https://aseanenergy.org/asean-nuclear-series-part-1-the-first-nuclear-power-station-in-asean/](https://aseanenergy.org/asean-nuclear-series-part-1-the-first-nuclear-power-station-in-asean/)\n- [https://www.nytimes.com/1978/01/14/archives/marcos-facing-criticism-may-end-1-billion-westinghouse-contract.html\\](https://www.nytimes.com/1978/01/14/archives/marcos-facing-criticism-may-end-1-billion-westinghouse-contract.html\\)\n- [https://www.rappler.com/nation/pnri-chief-bnpp-safe-dost-budget-hearing-october-2022/](https://www.rappler.com/nation/pnri-chief-bnpp-safe-dost-budget-hearing-october-2022/)\n- [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1927/ML19270H923.pdf](https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1927/ML19270H923.pdf)\n\n## Related Coverage" url: https://megaprojects.pub/article/bataan-nuclear-power-plant-saga-tumultuous-past-uncertain-tomorrow.md canonical: https://megaprojects.pub/article/bataan-nuclear-power-plant-saga-tumultuous-past-uncertain-tomorrow datePublished: 2026-06-25 dateModified: 2026-06-25 author: - name: Simon Whistler url: https://megaprojects.pub/author/simon-whistler publisher: MegaProjects image: "https://media.megaprojects.pub/cdn-cgi/image/width=600,height=338,fit=cover,quality=80,format=auto/articles/NjxZwbg69Fc/hero.jpg" type: NewsArticle contentHash: f1f813d2dc699435b28a5c019bcab6208f62b30edcb2240f4578463d03fd469d tokens: 6583 summaryUrl: https://megaprojects.pub/article/bataan-nuclear-power-plant-saga-tumultuous-past-uncertain-tomorrow.md.summary.md --- ## Introduction For as long as humans have known how to split the atom, so too have we known how to be nervous about splitting the atom. That skepticism isn't entirely baseless; catastrophes like Chernobyl, Fukushima, and Three-Mile Island have been a black mark on a means of energy production that is usually safe and fairly clean…but definitely has its issues from time to time. In many countries, skepticism over the risk posed by nuclear power has caused plants to be decommissioned early, or otherwise never be built at all. It's a headache for governments looking to move away from fossil fuels, and a persistently frustrating reality for nuclear scientists and advocates alike. But the nuclear woes of the rest of the world have got nothing on the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Conceived in an attempt to bring the Philippines what would have been its only source of nuclear power, the Bataan plant instead turned into a lightning rod of bad luck. From building complications and cost overruns, to legitimate fears of corruption, to a persistent and public opposition emboldened by a series of worldwide nuclear catastrophes, the plant turned into the perfect engineering example of Murphy's Law: Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong. ## Background and Construction The Philippines began its foray into nuclear energy in 1958, when the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission was established to lay the groundwork for a reactor. The Philippines had gotten access to a small uranium-235 fission reactor a few years prior, in which low-enriched uranium fuel could be studied and used to produce radioisotopes. This sort of research presented truly minimal risk to the people of the Philippines—seriously, as long as you didn't lick the uranium, you'd probably be fine. But even this early research effort had been met by significant skepticism and protest from the local community, so when the Atomic Energy Commission started doing its work, it was with that same uphill battle in mind. Now, to get around public pressure like that, there are a few main options. Officials could educate the public on the low risks and myriad benefits of nuclear energy, they could build away from population centers and critical infrastructure…or, they could declare martial law and do whatever they damn well pleased. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos hadn't declared martial law for that particular reason, but in 1973, he took advantage of the martial law he'd already declared to force the construction of a nuclear power plant. The regime's stated intent was to supply energy for the city of Luzon, via two reactors producing 621 megawatts of power each. In recent years, former Marcos deputies have alleged that the regime's actual goal was in part to facilitate nuclear weapons design, but at the time, the 1973 oil crisis had created a legitimate justification to be seeking nuclear power regardless. The regime actually planned for six power plants in total, but as we'll see, they appeared to have their hands full with one. The Marcos regime chose Napot Point to host their new power plant, taking advantage of protected land on one of Luzon Island's peninsulas. The regime accepted two proposals for the plant's design, one submitted by General Electric, and the other by Westinghouse Electric. The project immediately got off to a weird start; faced with a detailed, well-thought-out proposal from General Electric with a price-tag of $700 million, and a note from Westinghouse that basically said, "we can build you a plant for $500 million" but said nothing about how they'd do it, Marcos overruled his advisory committee and went for the Westinghouse option. Apparently, nobody in his committee was quite courageous enough to ask, "Ferdinand, what are you up to?", or if they did, then it didn't have much effect. The contract was awarded to Westinghouse in June 1974, despite not only the conflicting recommendations of Marcos' advisors, but the advice that the National Power Corporation had given him, as well. Funny enough, Westinghouse then paid somewhere between four million and thirty-five million dollars to one of President Marcos' close friends, who was also his in-law, who owned a company that had provided Westinghouse with "assistance in obtaining the contract". This friend, named Herminio Disini, was frequently asked to lobby President Marcos on various companies' behalf, with something like eighty percent of his recommendations to the President being acted on over the course of his lobbying career. And to make matters worse, the price of the plant more than doubled within a year, going from $500 million in 1974 to $1.2 billion in 1975. Why? Corruption, or as the regime put it, interest, transmission lines, and escalation costs. And another year later, word came down from Westinghouse that the Philippines would be getting just one 621-megawatt reactor, not two, and no, they wouldn't be reducing prices. If this all isn't bad enough, don't worry, we've got plenty more for you. The site for the nuclear plant was located just five miles from a dormant volcano known as Mount Natib—always a fantastic sign—with three active geological fault lines within twenty-five miles. A little further away was the stratovolcano Mount Pinatubo, which was at that time dormant, but has since become active. Not only did this present a massive risk via the possibility of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, but the plant's location on a peninsula surrounded by open sea also brought it within range of tsunami waves from anywhere across the Pacific Rim, which we'll describe today as…geologically spicy. Completely undeterred, the regime began construction on the plant in 1976, chugging along quite happily for the next three years despite continued public unease about the entire ordeal. In 1979, the nuclear disaster at Three Mile Island in the United States caused Westinghouse and the regime to put a temporary pause on construction, and mercifully, it appears that someone within the government was able to persuade Marcos and his advisors to conduct a safety review of the site. Good thing they did, because it found over four thousand defects. Personally, we'd like to think of the Marcos regime's failure to fix most of these defects as a factor that just adds to the plant's sort of rogueish charm, and Westinghouse seemed to agree. Although some of the issues were fixed, causing yet another doubling of the price to $2.3 billion by 1984, some were ignored, and construction continued within the same geological death trap that the safety report had pointed out was…well, a geological death trap. On top of the location issues, the plant's interior had also devolved into a complete mess. The plant's internal wiring was a catastrophe, the support brackets that held up miles of electrical cabling and disposal pipes for radioactive water were unstable, and its pipes and valves were untrustworthy. For some of the issues that Westinghouse had technically fixed, they hadn't actually made any hardware changes; instead, they just rewrote some of the specifications for the plant. Filipino regulators were frequently cajoled or coerced into approving elements of the project that should never have reasonably gotten permits, and by 1985, the interest charges on the plant were increasing by about $350,000 every single day. The whole thing had devolved far past the point of being a comedy of errors, and had now taken the shape of a full-on nightmare. ## Controversy and Opposition At this point in the story, we should hope that you're wondering how the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant continued to escape being shut down—and for what it's worth, the people of the Philippines were wondering the same thing. Bowing to public pressure amidst a much larger political upheaval, the Marcos regime didn't immediately activate the plant after it was completed in early 1985. It wasn't abandoned, it wasn't deconstructed or fixed up, it just…sat there. And there it would remain, until February 1986, when the People Power Revolution overthrew the Marcos regime and a successor administration, led by President Corazon Aquino, took power. The Aquino administration had their work cut out for them in a lot of ways, after inheriting a shattered political system from Marcos, but they were also stuck with the Bataan plant. It wouldn't be accurate to say that anybody in the Philippines needed yet another reason to be skeptical about the plant, but they got one anyway, two months after the Marcos regime fell. Across the world near the city of Pripyat, in what was then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the No. 4 reactor of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant suffered a catastrophic meltdown, compromising the plant and causing the worst nuclear disaster in history. The disaster at Chernobyl shocked the world, and made it abundantly clear to the Aquino administration that the reactor at Bataan was not worth taking chances. Days following the Chernobyl disaster, Aquino's administration publicly announced that the plant would not begin operation, for a laundry list of reasons including, but not limited to public skepticism, the myriad safety issues at the plant, and the clear influence of state corruption in the whole affair. The Aquino government publicly accused the Westinghouse company of having bribed former President Marcos, and although Westinghouse attempted to write off Aquino's accusations because of prior Aquino campaign promises not to operate the plant regardless, those excuses went un-heard. Whether or not Westinghouse should have seen such a scandal coming, it was upon them now, and a company that had safely operated 71 other nuclear plants internationally with no major accidents was now responsible for a plant that could not even be turned on. The United States Department of Justice reopened a bribery investigation against Westinghouse, which had previously been dropped in 1978, and when it reopened, the investigation got the full and enthusiastic support of the Aquino government. Westinghouse had plead guilty to prior charges, also in 1978, of having bribed Egyptian authorities in order to secure a contract for a conventional power plant, and by 1986, it had been either bidding or in early talks to build nuclear plants in South Korea, Yugoslavia, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, the Netherlands, and Egypt. Several of those national governments were already known for widespread corruption; several have had those suspicions reaffirmed in the years since. And with the entire world now fully aware of the consequences of a Chernobyl-style plant gone wrong, Westinghouse's shoddy work in the Philippines would raise eyebrows even among governments who were open to a bit of financial persuasion. In the Philippines, the ramifications of the power plant's breakdown were severe. We've already mentioned that $2.3-billion price tag for the plant, but let's now put that number in context to the Philippines' GDP at that time, just $17 billion with a government budget of $1.5 billion. The plant's cost overruns by this point were so bad that even if the Philippines had stopped every other government function for an entire year, sent every public employee home, and ground the entire nation to a halt, they still would have owed $800 million after the year was up. The nation took on a massive amount of debt to deal with the cost of the plant, and again, they'd have nothing to show for it. The Aquino government created a cabinet position for minister Rene Saguisag, whose sole responsibility was dealing with the plant and its repercussions. The plant's inactivity was a big part of the rolling blackouts that took hold of the Philippines for years, from 1989 to 1993, which the government had seen coming for multiple years prior. But even more potentially harmful than those blackouts was the threat of turning the Bataan plant on, and then running the risk of a catastrophic equipment failure. Or an earthquake. Or a volcanic eruption. Or a tsunami. Or all of the above. In the following years, Westinghouse would be sued for overpricing and bribery, but would be exonerated by a federal jury in the US state of New Jersey. After an appeals process, the Philippine government would eventually drop their suit for an unknown settlement of under $200 million. The Philippines had placed a two-year ban on Westinghouse products, but that ban was dropped during the settlement, as well. Westinghouse continued to insist that the plant was safe, even amidst ongoing findings from the Philippine government's external consultants that the plant should not be operated. Over the years, reports circulated that the Philippines might try and convert the plant into a conventional power station, but that resolution simply makes less economic sense than just building a conventional plant from scratch. One person would be held responsible, though: Herminio Disini, who had lobbied his friend and in-law Ferdinand Marcos to accept the Westinghouse contract in the first place. In the decade that followed the collapse of the Marcos regime, Disini would watch his business empire crumble into ruin, eventually leaving the country to live in Austria. At the time, he was ordered to return $50 million in commissions that he had been paid because of the power plant deal, and turning ahead the clock a bit, his estate was forced to pay a billion dollars in damages in a 2021 judicial order, after Disini's death in 2014. ## Cancellation and Resuscitation So, that was the end of the Philippines' ambitions on nuclear power. The plant at Bataan had been a resounding failure, an ill-advised venture that demonstrated a remarkable ability to make itself worse, and worse, and worse. It had all been a ploy, a mechanism for Ferdinand Marcos, his cronies, and Westinghouse Electric to make themselves richer, with no regard for the possibility that they were setting conditions for a disaster that would have made Chernobyl look like a stubbed toe. Except…that isn't where the story ends. The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant had hit rock-bottom, but even still, it's never been shut down. The Philippines have paid somewhere between $40 and 50 million a year to maintain the plant, for which the reactor unit is still intact, as the government continues to try and figure out what to do with it. In fact, the thing's been open to tourists for over a decade now, partially in an effort to educate the public about the long-term potential of safe nuclear energy—using the Bataan plant as a lesson learned, and a guide as to what not to do, in order to start a conversation about how the Philippines can get it right in the future. In fact, the Philippines' eventual goal of opening a nuclear power plant hasn't gone away, even despite all the issues with their initial attempt in Bataan. The country has some of the highest domestic electricity needs in all of Asia, and given its status as a relatively poor nation within the region, there's still an emergent need for power that a nuclear plant would help significantly—and the Bataan plant is right there. With disasters like Chernobyl and even Fukushima in the rearview mirror, and a relatively stable political situation that could hypothetically oversee a second attempt, many within the Philippines are beginning to view the Bataan plant as a fixer-upper with real potential. The Philippines have spent a good bit of time embroiled in dynastic politics; in 2011, when the plant opened as a tourist attraction, the President was Benigno Aquino, son of President Corazon Aquino, who shuttered the plant in the first place. Today, after the six-year rule of Rodrigo Duterte, the President is one Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and, no, it's not a coincidence that the country's late former dictator, also named Ferdinand Marcos, just happened to be old enough to be Marcos Jr.'s dad. With his father's nuclear plant now fully paid off, Marcos Jr., affectionately known as "Bongbong", has made nuclear power a top priority for his administration—and restarting the Bataan plant is priority number one. Bongbong isn't the only one who believes resuscitating the plant could be a good idea. The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, found in 2008 that the power plant could have thirty years of good operation in it if it's refurbished and brought up to standards. That would come at a cost of around a billion additional dollars, but for what it's worth, the country's GDP has come a long way since $17 billion. In 2021, the national GDP was close to $400 billion, making a big expenditure like renovations on the Bataan plant seem at least more manageable. The Philippines' National Power Corporation has also solicited an assessment by Korea Electric Power Corp, which manages nuclear and other power stations, and that assessment found in 2009 that by their estimation, the Bataan plant should be refurbished. Korea Electric manages a very similar reactor in Korea, known as Kori 2. The National Power Corporation has continued to advocate for a commissioning of the Bataan plant ever since, pointing out that even the billion-dollar price tag is about three times cheaper than building coal-fired power plants to handle an equivalent capacity. As of now, the Philippine Department of Energy has been issued a mandate to develop and implement a nuclear program. The mandate includes yet another assessment on the viability of the Bataan plant, where the price for refurbishment has since risen to $2.3 billion by 2022. Whether that assessment finds a refurbishment feasible, the government does plan to pursue nuclear power broadly, with up to 15 locations identified to host potential plants. The United States has begun to engage as a partner in supplying nuclear fuel and reactors for future construction, although details are not yet forthcoming. If the Bataan plant ends up being found ready for refurbishment, it'll still face a series of uphill battles. In addition to the price tag and the long list of defects that need addressing, it'll have to be modernized. Even in the best-case scenario, the plant is staying put where it is, so it'll have to be reinforced against earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other geologic threats. And in the Philippines, especially in the areas around the Bataan plant, perceptions of nuclear energy remain predominantly negative. If the plant is to be commissioned, it'll either be in the face of public opposition, or it'll come after that public perception somehow changes. But if the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant finally manages to get up and running, it'll put a finish on one of the most dramatic stories of any megaproject out there—a build where really, truly, everything that can go wrong, did go wrong, but managed to come back from the brink. If there's anything that is truly rare, in our world of successful and failed engineering endeavors, it's a megaproject that gets a second chance, where a new generation can come along and get something right, even after the prior generation left the whole thing in shambles. For the plant in Bataan, we can't say for sure that that second chance will come…but it's damn close, and if the Philippines can pull it off, then a truly exceptional redemption arc will have been etched into history. ## Key Takeaways - The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant in the Philippines faced numerous issues, including cost overruns, corruption, and public opposition. - Construction began under President Ferdinand Marcos, who ignored safety concerns and geological risks. - The plant was never operational due to the Chernobyl disaster and subsequent public and political pressure. - Despite its troubled history, the Bataan plant remains intact and is being considered for refurbishment. - Current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has prioritized nuclear power and is exploring the plant's potential. ## Frequently Asked Questions ### What is the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant? The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant is a nuclear power plant in the Philippines that was conceived to bring the country its only source of nuclear power. However, it turned into a lightning rod of bad luck due to building complications, cost overruns, corruption, and public opposition. ### When was the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission established? The Philippine Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1958 to lay the groundwork for a nuclear reactor. ### Why was the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant constructed? The plant was constructed to supply energy for the city of Luzon via two reactors producing 621 megawatts of power each. The regime also had plans to facilitate nuclear weapons design, although the 1973 oil crisis provided a legitimate justification for seeking nuclear power. ### What were some of the major issues faced during the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant? The construction faced building complications, cost overruns, corruption, and public opposition. The site was located near a dormant volcano and active geological fault lines, and the plant's interior had significant issues with wiring, support brackets, and pipes. ### What happened to the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant after the People Power Revolution in 1986? After the People Power Revolution, the new administration led by President Corazon Aquino decided not to operate the plant due to public skepticism, safety issues, and corruption. The plant was never activated and remained inactive. ### What was the impact of the Chernobyl disaster on the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant? The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 reinforced the Aquino administration's decision not to operate the Bataan plant, highlighting the risks and the influence of corruption in its construction. ### What is the current status of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant? The plant has never been shut down and is maintained at a cost of $40-50 million a year. It has been open to tourists for over a decade, and there are discussions about refurbishing and reactivating it. ### What are the plans for the future of nuclear power in the Philippines? The Philippines plans to develop and implement a nuclear program, with up to 15 locations identified for potential plants. The Bataan plant is a candidate for refurbishment, and the U.S. has begun engaging as a partner in supplying nuclear fuel and reactors. ### Who was held responsible for the issues with the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant? Herminio Disini, who lobbied President Marcos to accept the Westinghouse contract, was held responsible. His estate was ordered to pay a billion dollars in damages in a 2021 judicial order. ### What are the potential challenges for reactivating the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant? The plant faces challenges such as a high price tag for refurbishment, a long list of defects, the need for modernization, and public opposition. It also needs to be reinforced against geological threats. ## Sources - [Original MegaProjects video: The Bataan Nuclear Power Plant Saga: A Tumultuous Past and an Uncertain Tomorrow](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NjxZwbg69Fc) - [https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/09/01/67989/](https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1986/09/01/67989/) - [https://books.google.com/books?id=drykAQAACAAJ](https://books.google.com/books?id=drykAQAACAAJ) - [https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/16/business/westinghouse-pact-with-philippines.html](https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/16/business/westinghouse-pact-with-philippines.html) - [https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/15/21/sc-awards-over-p1b-in-damages-to-ph-vs-late-marcos-crony-over-nuke-plant-project](https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/15/21/sc-awards-over-p1b-in-damages-to-ph-vs-late-marcos-crony-over-nuke-plant-project) - [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14184234](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14184234) - [https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/397/bataan-plant-sequel](https://wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/397/bataan-plant-sequel) - [https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/12/613/12613423.pdf?r=1](https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/12/613/12613423.pdf?r=1) - [https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx) - [https://tradingeconomics.com/philippines/gdp](https://tradingeconomics.com/philippines/gdp) - [https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/philippines.aspx) - [http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/camacho2/](http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/camacho2/) - [https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/duterte-approves-inclusion-nuclear-power-philippine-energy-mix-2022-03-03/](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/duterte-approves-inclusion-nuclear-power-philippine-energy-mix-2022-03-03/) - [https://energycentral.com/c/pip/bataan-nuclear-power-plant-philippines-nuclear-plant-and-dream-fizzles](https://energycentral.com/c/pip/bataan-nuclear-power-plant-philippines-nuclear-plant-and-dream-fizzles) - [https://www.powermag.com/philippines-may-restart-bataan-nuclear-plant-project/](https://www.powermag.com/philippines-may-restart-bataan-nuclear-plant-project/) - [https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Philippines-relaunches-nuclear-energy-programme](https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Philippines-relaunches-nuclear-energy-programme) - [https://aseanenergy.org/asean-nuclear-series-part-1-the-first-nuclear-power-station-in-asean/](https://aseanenergy.org/asean-nuclear-series-part-1-the-first-nuclear-power-station-in-asean/) - [https://www.nytimes.com/1978/01/14/archives/marcos-facing-criticism-may-end-1-billion-westinghouse-contract.html\](https://www.nytimes.com/1978/01/14/archives/marcos-facing-criticism-may-end-1-billion-westinghouse-contract.html\) - [https://www.rappler.com/nation/pnri-chief-bnpp-safe-dost-budget-hearing-october-2022/](https://www.rappler.com/nation/pnri-chief-bnpp-safe-dost-budget-hearing-october-2022/) - [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1927/ML19270H923.pdf](https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1927/ML19270H923.pdf) ## Related Coverage